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“Form,” according to architect Louis Sullivan, “follows function” 
(he was not the first to say so).1 So what one wants from the Supreme 
Court governs its design. In a nutshell, if the aim is error correction 
resolving circuit conflicts, a fifteen-member Supreme Court sitting in 
panels might be a good idea,2 but if one wants something quite 
different, it could be a bad one. A word first about the first two, and a 
further word about complaints that the Court’s docket has stagnated.3 
A bench several times the size of the current Supreme Court 
would not make much of a dent in the thirty thousand or so federal 
appeals cases decided on the merits each year. One layer of appellate 
review is a safeguard against error; two layers, when each bench 
comprises Article III judges, is superfluous. And, in truth, what 
appellate judges or Justices call error is often, albeit not always, the 
substitution of one plausible view for another. 
Too much time is spent hand-wringing about circuit conflicts. 
Law in Maine and in Massachusetts is different, and the world goes 
on. Conflicting legal rulings by two circuits on an issue of federal law 
may in the abstract be less tolerable; but each case gets decided—the 
prime function of courts. The illusion of a single “right” answer is a 
good carrot for the judicial donkey, but competing positions get aired, 
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and a consensus often develops without help from the Supreme 
Court.4 
As for the Supreme Court’s modest-sized docket, the current 
Court does not need as many cases to reach its goals as in the busier 
Warren era. An activist Supreme Court (whether on the right or the 
left) needs more cases because it is altering the law and telling lower 
courts where and how far to go. The present Supreme Court, less 
activist than earlier editions (despite a few bursts of inventiveness), 
does not need the same volume. The Court could fulfill its main 
task—deciding matters of great national importance—at half its 
current volume. Charges of stagnation are usually a way of expressing 
a political viewpoint. 
The nationally important cases are often constitutional but not 
always. Determining generally how far the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act preempts state law or what basic rules govern in 
the various employment discrimination statutes matters to the 
country. In the nature of things, no panel of the Supreme Court could 
properly have the last word on such matters. A large bench may be 
unwieldy but it performs a representative function; and constitutional 
courts in other countries are sometimes even larger. 
Time taken by Justices from work on large issues, in order to 
correct routine errors or resolve tolerable circuit conflicts, would 
misuse the scarcest judicial of all resources—the time of Justices. That 
some Justices undertake public speaking or other engagements 
outside the Court may to some suggest underemployment. Given the 
nature of the issues that arise in big cases—issues calling for 
statesmanship as much as technical legal skill—a greater exposure of 
Justices to the country is perhaps a positive virtue. 
An admixture of less important cases is fine; Justices are 
expected to be judges as well as statesmen. But deciding the big cases 
has become their raison d’être, and for that task a Court of nine 
Justices is probably about right: large enough to provide 
representative views but small enough (though barely so) to produce 
a coherent majority position most of the time. Scholarly assessments 
are always welcome; but the present Court’s existing structure suits 
the role it has assumed. 
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